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FROM GARNER TO GRAHAM AND BEYOND: POLICE
LIABILITY FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE – FERGUSON CASE
STUDY
KYLE J. JACOB *
INTRODUCTION
At approximately noon on Saturday, August 9, 2014, an unarmed
black teenager was shot to death by a white police officer in the St.
Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri. The details of the shooting have
been widely disputed. Some believe that the officer was jumped,
beaten, and overpowered and resorted to the only measure he had
available to defend himself from a hostile assailant. Others believe
the officer’s use of deadly force amounted to criminal homicide. Suffice it to say, popular opinion regarding the shooting is anything but
unified. Regardless of the ultimate question of responsibility, in the
aftermath of the shooting, media headlines, blogs, commentary, and
social media posts tell a harrowing tale of social unrest that blazed
not only through the streets of Ferguson, but across the entire nation:
“Ferguson Police shoots unarmed black kid 10 times” 1; “An Unarmed Teen’s Killing: Understanding the Brown Case” 2; “Missouri
crowd after shooting: ‘Kill the Police’” 3; “‘Crying for Justice’: Thousands Attend Michael Brown Funeral” 4; “Prosecutor in Brown Case

12/28/2015 14:43:02
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1. SouthernGirl2, Ferguson Police Shoots Unarmed Black Kid 10 Times, 3CHICSPOLITICO
(Aug. 9, 2014), http://3chicspolitico.com/2014/08/09/ferguson-police-shoots-unarmed-blackkid-10-times-2/.
2. Elizabeth Chuck, The Killing of an Unarmed Teen: What We know About Brown’s
Death, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014, 5:03 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michaelbrown-shooting/killing-unarmed-teen-what-we-know-about-browns-death-n178696.
3. Alan Scher Zagier, Missouri Crowd After Shooting: ‘Kill the Police’, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Aug. 10, 2014, 5:44 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/missouri-crowd-after-shooting-kill-police.
4. John Brecher & Tracy Connor, ‘Crying for Justice’: Thousands Mourn Michael Brown
at Funeral, NBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michaelbrown-shooting/crying-justice-thousands-mourn-michael-brown-funeral-n188346.
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Has Deep Family Ties to Police” 5; “Evidence supports officer’s account of shooting in Ferguson” 6; “Doesn’t take 100 days to decide
if murder is a crime, it takes 100 days to figure out how to tell people
it isn’t. . . #FergusonDecision” 7; “In Protests From Midwest to Both
Coasts, Fury Boils Over” 8; “I find it very disappointing that you’re
not talking about the fact that 93% of blacks in America are killed
by other blacks . . . Why don’t you cut it down so so many white
police officers don’t have to be in black areas . . . The white police
officers wouldn’t be there if you weren’t killing each other” 9; “Businesses Ablaze, Bullets Fly in Mayhem After Grand Jury Decision” 10;
“Violence like we saw last night cannot be repeated. Mtg w/ law
enforcement & Guard to ensure protection of lives & property in
days ahead.” 11; “What’s happened here in the last six years? Gays
got gay marriage, Hispanics got amnesty for illegals, and AfricanAmericans apparently are gonna be able to riot without anybody
stopping them if they want to.” 12

Regardless of where the truth lies, what we are left with is a dead
body, an ostracized police officer, and an angry public, vigilant and
bent on vengeance at one end of the spectrum, ignorant and insensitive to the reality of racial tensions that continue to fester in many
poverty-stricken urban settings on the other. We are also left with a
question: Who is responsible for Michael Brown’s death? One obvious answer is Officer Darren Wilson. Another is the Ferguson Police
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5. Elizabeth Chuck, Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case Has Deep Family Ties to Police,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brownshooting/prosecutor-michael-brown-case-has-deep-family-ties-police-n183911.
6. Kimberly Kindy & Sari Horwitz, Evidence Supports Officer’s Account of Shooting in Ferguson, W ASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-evidencesupports-officers-account-of-shooting-in-ferguson/2014/10/22/cf38c7b4-5964-11e4-bd61346aee66ba29_story.html.
7. Chris Rock (@ozchrisrock), TWITTER (Nov. 24, 2014, 8:17 PM), https://twitter.com/ozchrisrock/status/537067600447275008.
8. John Eligon & Manny Fernandez, In Protests from Midwest to Both Coasts, Fury Boils
Over, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/frustration-monthsin-the-making-boils-over-on-the-streets-of-ferguson.html.
9. Stephen Rex Brown, Rudy Giuliani Causes Racial Firestorm for Citing Black Crime
Stats in Debate on Michael Brown Shooting (VIDEO), DAILY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014, 5:16 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/rudy-giuliani-firestorm-comments-mo-shooting-article-1.2021368.
10. Ron Allen & Erin McClam, Ferguson: Businesses Ablaze, Bullets Fly in Overnight Mayhem over Grand Jury, NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michaelbrown-shooting/ferguson-businesses-ablaze-bullets-fly-overnight-mayhem-over-grand-juryn255526.
11. Governor Jay Nixon (@GovJayNixon), TWITTER (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:18 AM), https://twitter.com/GovJayNixon/status/537263998560129025.
12. Rush Limbaugh, Holder Goes Full-Scale Hamas: Cops Are Occupying Force in Neighborhoods of Color, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2014/12/02/holder_goes_full_scale_hamas_cops_are_occupying_force_in
_neighborhoods_of_color.
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Department. Yet another is Michael Brown. A fourth, society. And perhaps a final possibility is some combination of all four. What is unquestionable is that we, as a society, have a fundamental need to
place blame and responsibility somewhere.
Responsibility, of course, can mean several different things. 13
This paper seeks to take up the question of responsibility in the context of civil liability for Michael Brown’s death 14 under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“§ 1983”) pertaining to actions against government officials for
deprivation of citizens’ civil rights. 15
This paper does not presume to have complete knowledge of
what actually happened on the afternoon of August 9, 2014, nor does
it intend to place any judgment upon the parties, regardless of where
fault or blame truly lies. The purpose of this article, rather, is to perform a modest socio-legal analysis to consider how a specific case of
police use of force, particularly deadly force, may impact a community, and even society at large, in controversial cases where assignment of blame, or more precisely liability, is not clear. The shooting
death of Michael Brown at the hands of the police has illuminated the
simple truth that “justice,” as the public perceives it, is as much about
appearance as it is about substance. Put simply, the current state of
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13. The focus of this article is on civil liability for excessive force by police officers in the
commission of their duties. In order to hold a law enforcement agency liable for a § 1983 claim
(as opposed to the individual officers), a plaintiff must show there was improper or insufficient
training in the use of force that contributed to the officer’s unreasonable use of force. See, e.g.,
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989). A plaintiff may also sue the public
municipality in which the law enforcement agency resides for allowing a custom or policy that
fosters police misuse of force. See, e.g., MacEachern v. City of Manhattan Beach, 623
F.Supp.2d 1092, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In addition to the three § 1983 claims against Wilson,
the police department and the municipality, state common law claims for wrongful death, MO.
ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (West 2014), and first degree assault, MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.050 (West
2014), could also be pleaded under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). The state common law claims would be particularly vulnerable to summary judgment
based on the doctrine of official immunity which shields individual officers, police agencies and
municipalities from tort liability arising from claims related to the performance of their discretionary acts, and prevents liability from attaching when an officer is acting to respond to an emergency. See, e.g., Conway v. St. Louis Cty., 254 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Mo. App. E. Dist. 2008) (citing
Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int’l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. 2006)).
14. Most states, including Missouri, have survivor statutes which allow a deceased person’s estate to maintain a cause of action on behalf of the decedent/plaintiff for tort actions
resulting in personal injury or death. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.020 (West 2014). Therefore, any lawsuit would be brought by Brown’s next of kin, likely his mother.
15. While there had been a substantial push to hold Officer Wilson criminally responsible
for the death of Michael Brown, a Missouri Grand Jury proceeding as well as a federal Justice
Department investigation conducted did not result in any criminal charges against Officer Wilson. See Eyder Peralta & Bill Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No Charges for Officer in Michael
Brown’s Death, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 24, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/11/24/366370100/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-michael-brown-case.
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the law regulating police use of deadly force, particularly when racial
undertones exist, does not seem just to those claiming a disparate
impact, regardless of how the legal process may work out in practice.
It is this perception of injustice and inequity that stokes the flames of
public animosity and outrage over cases like that of Michael Brown.
Section I of this paper will discuss the general law and necessary
elements for a prima facie case under § 1983, including protections
afforded to government officials in such proceedings. Section II will
take up an evaluation of the “objective reasonableness” standard announced by the Supreme Court in evaluating claims brought under §
1983 for excessive force by looking at the progression of the legal
standard employed in the two leading use of force cases, Tennessee
v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989). Section II also discusses how a § 1983 claim would proceed under the existing standard announced in Garner and Graham, using the rough and
developing facts of the Ferguson situation as a case study. Section III
examines a substantive due process standard as a possible alternative to use in analyzing a § 1983 claim as advanced by Judge Friendly
in his decision in Johnson v. Glick (1976), which was accepted as a
possible alternative standard by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion in Graham. Finally, Section III also explores the problem with
exclusive reliance on the Fourth Amendment, with its corresponding
“objective reasonableness” standard, to support a claim of excessive
force under § 1983 and how Judge Friendly’s alternative substantive
due process standard addresses those shortcomings.

A civil claim against a law enforcement officer, and the agency
employing them, for excessive force, including improper use of deadly
force, is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 16

12/28/2015 14:43:02

16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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In order to successfully bring a claim under § 1983 for excessive
force, a plaintiff begins by identifying the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed upon by the challenged application of force. 17 In
an excessive force case, this will generally involve a claimed violation
of the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 18 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 19

The term “seizure” in a policing context means more than simply
an arrest in the traditional sense. The legal term spans a wide spectrum, from a routine traffic stop, to pre-arrest interrogation, to the application of force. 20 As the intrusiveness of the search or seizure
intensifies, the scrutiny applied to whether it was reasonable intensifies. 21 Therefore, the highest level of scrutiny is employed in evaluating the utilization of deadly force. 22
To defend against an assertion that a seizure was unreasonable
per se, a showing of probable cause to support the seizure must be
made. 23 Typically, an officer establishes probable cause to support a
particular search or seizure by obtaining a warrant issued by a judicial
officer. 24 However, when exigent or emergency circumstances make
obtaining a warrant impossible, or at least impracticable, a police officer is required to have articulable probable cause in order to combat
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 172 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

17. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating “[i]t is quite plain that the Fourth
Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in . . . ‘arrests’ in traditional
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Id.
21. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 843 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (holding “[t]he ‘totality of the circumstances’ must be examined to
determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonableness ‘is
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.’”)).
22. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47
F.3d 1011, 1014 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (reasoning “the use of ‘deadly force’ is only justified if the
officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to
the officer or others . . . the kind of surrounding circumstances that uniquely justify the use of
deadly force—a threat of serious physical harm or worse”)).
23. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
24. Id.; Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012); Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
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an assertion that the seizure was per se unreasonable for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. 25 Probable cause exists
when there are “facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” 26 The Supreme Court has held that, in evaluating the totality
of the circumstances available to the officer at the time of the search
or seizure, the standard to be employed is that of a “prudent person.” 27 The officer’s subjective belief, or intent, is irrelevant to the
analysis of probable cause. 28 In situations where obtaining a warrant
is not possible or practical, an officer may establish probable cause
when “a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have
reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well established law.” 29 By obtaining arguable probable cause, police officers
are entitled to immunity from civil liability. 30
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials,
such as police officers, “from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 31 Qualified
immunity is generally sought in the form of a dispositive motion and
is meant to prevent non-actionable claims from proceeding past the
preliminary, dispositive stage of litigation. 32 Failure to raise a defense
of qualified immunity during the initial pleading stage, or very shortly
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 172 Side B
12/28/2015 14:43:02

25. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding “that
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment must yield [where] exigent circumstances
require law enforcement officers to act without delay”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Andino, 768 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
26. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
111 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175–76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
27. United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
28. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
29. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Gold v. City of Miami, 121
F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202–03 (2d Cir.
2001).
30. Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202–03.
31. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
32. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring); Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2006).
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33. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Headwaters Forest Defense v. Humbold, 276 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002)
(wherein officers used Q-tips to apply pepper spray to the eyes of nonviolent protestors and
failed to wash it out); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (wherein police
officer shot an unarmed, compliant suspect in the head with a less-lethal beanbag ammunition
without warning out of a desire to immediately resolve the situation).
35. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d
919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Gallegos v. Freeman, 291 P.3d 265, 270 (Wash. App.
Div. 1 2013) review denied, 308 P.3d 641 (Wash. 2013) (holding an officer utilizing deadly force
to apprehend a fleeing suspect was entitled to qualified immunity).
36. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
37. Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
38. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
39. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200–01.
40. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 173 Side A

thereafter, by a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment
generally results in a presumptive waiver of the defense whereby defendant will be precluded from raising it as a defense at trial or on
appeal. 33
If the officer’s conduct was clearly unreasonable, qualified immunity will be denied. 34 In the context of an excessive force claim, the
doctrine of qualified immunity operates “to protect officers from the
sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” 35
“Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when [he or] she
makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably
misapprehends the law governing the circumstances [he or] she confronted.” 36 It extends to a government official’s “objectively reasonable mistakes, ‘regardless of whether the government official’s error is
a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” 37
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 38 To resolve this
inquiry, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz set forth a two-step inquiry to determine whether a government official is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. 39 In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court
granted lower courts more flexibility “to exercise their sound discretion
in deciding which of the two prongs . . . should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 40
In applying the Saucier test, the Eighth Circuit reasoned:
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In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity,
we ask (1) whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to
the injured party, the alleged facts demonstrate that the official’s
conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the asserted
constitutional right is clearly established. We may address either
question first. If either question is answered in the negative, the
public official is entitled to qualified immunity. To determine whether
a right is clearly established we ask whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted. 41

Once it has been determined that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity, whether the officer faces liability, in their official capacity, for excessive force under § 1983 turns on whether the use of force
was “reasonable.” The natural question that arises is, what constitutes
a “reasonable” use of force? And, should the same standard apply to
both the use of less-lethal force and deadly force? To explore these
questions, we turn first to the story of Edward Garner.
II. FROM GARNER TO GRAHAM – “OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS”
AND MICHAEL BROWN
A. Tennessee v. Garner

12/28/2015 14:43:02

41. Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Brown v. City of
Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009); Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d
984, 987–88 (8th Cir. 2009).
42. Tennessee v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 173 Side B

In the 1985 case of Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court
held that a Tennessee law stating, if upon giving lawful notice of intent
to arrest, a criminal defendant attempts to flee, “the officer may use
all the necessary means to effect the arrest,” was unconstitutional. 42
The Court reasoned that this law violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures because it authorized the
use of deadly force against unarmed, non-dangerous, fleeing suspects. 43
In Garner, two Memphis police officers, Elton Hymon and Leslie
Wright, responded to a call for a suspected burglary at approximately
10:45 p.m. 44 Upon arriving on scene, the officers observed the suspect run across the backyard, stopping and crouching at the base of
a 6-foot tall chain link fence. 45 At trial, Officer Hymon testified that he
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shone a flashlight on the suspect, later identified as Edward Garner. 46
While he could not be certain, Hymon testified he was “reasonably
sure” and “figured” that Garner was unarmed. 47 Officer Hymon also
testified that, based on what he observed, he believed the suspect
was about five foot five inches tall, had a slight build, and was about
seventeen or eighteen years old. 48 Officer Hymon issued a verbal
command to Garner, calling out “police halt,” and took a few steps
towards him when Garner jumped up and began to climb the fence. 49
Officer Hymon testified that he was convinced that if Garner made it
over the fence he would escape and therefore fired one shot, fatally
wounding him with a shot to the back of his head. 50
Garner’s father brought a claim under § 1983 for violation of his
deceased son’s civil rights with regards to the police’s use of deadly
force. 51 The Court stated that, to ascertain whether the seizure was
reasonable, they must balance the extent of the intrusion against the
need for it. 52 In performing this calculus, the Court reasoned, “[t]he
suspect’s fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated
upon,” and that “[t]he use of deadly force also frustrates the interest
of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and
punishment.” 53 On the other hand, the Court reasoned that “[a]gainst
these interests are ranged governmental interests in effective law enforcement,” including the State’s assertion that “overall violence will
be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who
know that they may be shot if they flee.” 54 In weighing these competing interests, the Court held “[w]ithout in any way disparaging the importance of these [government] goals, we are not convinced that the
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 174 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3–4. Edward Garner was in fact 15 years old and was confirmed to be unarmed
when he was killed. Id. at 24. It was also confirmed that the house was unoccupied at the time
of the burglary. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, City of Memphis, Tenn., 600 F.2d 52, 53 (6th
Cir. 1979). Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on Garner’s body. Garner,
471 U.S. at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5; Garner’s father was able to bring the claim under the Tennessee survivor statute as next of kin on behalf of his deceased son. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (West 2011).
52. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
53. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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55. Id. at 10 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11–12.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting a car could be a
deadly weapon so officer using deadly force to stop the car from injuring others was reasonable).
60. See, e.g., Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding an officer “had
probable cause to believe that [a] truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to
innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves”); contra Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5
F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding summary judgment inappropriate on a Fourth Amendment
claim involving a fleeing suspect because the suspect’s failure to brake when an officer suddenly
stepped in front of his just-started vehicle was not a sufficiently serious threat to justify the use
of deadly force).
61. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Garner, 471 U.S. at
29 (Burger J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Garner, 471 U.S. at 29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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use of deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to justify killing of nonviolent suspects.” 55 The Court ultimately held that, “[i]t is not better that all felony suspects die than that
they escape,” and ruled that the Tennessee statute was thus unconstitutional “insofar as it authorize[d] the use of deadly force against . . .
fleeing suspects.” 56
However, the Court did not foreclose the use of deadly force to
apprehend a fleeing suspect as being unconstitutional per se. Instead, the Court held that where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to
the officer or the public at large, it is not constitutionally unreasonable
to prevent escape by using deadly force. 57 The Court clarified that, “if
the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction
or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escapes, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.” 58
Following the decision in Garner, there has been much debate
among the lower courts as to what constitutes a “weapon” 59 as well
as when a suspect “poses a threat of serious physical harm” 60 to either the officer or the public at large.
Interestingly, the decision in Garner was not unanimous. In her
dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor 61 took issue with the majority’s
underlying assumption that “[t]he suspect’s fundamental interest in his
own life need not be elaborated upon.” 62 Justice O’Connor argued
that, “[t]his blithe assertion hardly provides an adequate substitute for
the majority’s failure to acknowledge the distinctive manner in which
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the suspect’s interest in his life is even exposed to risk.” 63 Instead,
Justice O’Connor gave greater weight to the government’s interest in
general crime control and deterrence reasoning “[t]he legitimate interests of the suspect in these circumstances are adequately accommodated . . . [to] avoid the use of deadly force and the consequent risk
to his life, the suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt.” 64
While an entire article could be devoted to how the public reacted
to the Court’s decision in Garner, a snapshot supports the presumption that public perception following the death of Edward Garner was
diametrically opposed to Justice O’Connor’s view of acceptable use
of force standards. 65 What was clear was that constitutional limits
needed to be placed on police use of force, particularly when dealing
with application of deadly force. Ironically, the bounds of those limits
proved much more harmonious with Justice O’Connor’s view of the
proper standard for evaluating police use of force than the majority
opinion in Garner seemed to suggest. To explore this further, we turn
to the case of Dethrone Graham.
B. Graham v. Connor

12/28/2015 14:43:02

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Welcome Curb on Deadly Force, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/29/opinion/a-welcome-curb-on-deadly-force.html; Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Limits Rights of Police to Shoot to Kill, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/28/us/high-court-limits-rights-of-police-to-shoot-to-kill.html.
66. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
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Four years after the decision in Garner, in the case of Graham v.
Connor, Dethrone Graham brought an action under § 1983 against
Officer Connor and the Charlotte Police Department claiming a violation of his civil rights based on a seizure while police investigated a
suspected shoplifting incident. 66
One important difference between the Garner and Graham cases
is that Graham did not involve police use of deadly force. However,
as is discussed in Section III, despite this glaring difference, the majority in Graham essentially abrogated the substantive distinction between application of non-deadly and deadly force.
On the morning of the incident in question, Graham, a diabetic,
felt the onset of an insulin reaction and asked a friend, William Berry,
to drive him to a nearby convenience store to buy orange juice in order
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to stabilize his blood sugar levels. 67 Berry did as his friend asked, but
when they arrived at the store, Graham saw that there were a number
of customers ahead of him in the checkout line. 68 Concerned over the
delay this would cause in regulating his blood sugar, Graham rushed
out of the store and asked Berry to take him to Berry’s house instead. 69
Officer Connor observed Graham hastily enter and exit the store
and became suspicious, leading him to follow Berry’s car. 70 Officer
Connor made an investigatory stop of the vehicle and, despite Berry’s
attempt to explain the situation, ordered both men to wait where they
were until he could find out what occurred at the convenience store. 71
When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to call for backup, Graham, who had begun to enter into diabetic shock, exited the vehicle,
ran around it twice and collapsed on the curb, where he passed out
briefly. 72 Shortly thereafter, several other Charlotte police officers arrived on scene in response to the request for backup. 73
At this time, one of the officers rolled Graham onto the sidewalk
and applied handcuffs tightly behind his back, ignoring pleas from
Berry that Graham was diabetic and needed sugar. 74 The officers dismissed Berry’s assertion that Graham had diabetes, with one making
disparaging comments and suggesting instead that he was drunk. 75
Several officers then proceeded to lift Graham up from behind, carry
him to Berry’s car, and slam him face down on the hood of the vehicle. 76 Once he regained consciousness, Graham asked officers to
check his wallet for a diabetic decal he carried, but this request was
met with more disparaging remarks. 77 Shortly thereafter, Officer Connor received a report that Graham had not done anything wrong and
drove him home where he released him. 78 As a result of this incident,
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Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and developed a loud ringing in his right
ear. 79
Graham brought suit claiming the police used excessive force in
making the pre-arrest seizure. 80 While considering a motion for directed verdict brought by the defendants, the District Court considered a four factored test to determine when the use of excessive force
gave rise to a cause of action under § 1983. 81 Those factors included:
“(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between
that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the
injury inflicted; and (4) ‘[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.’” 82 The District Court granted
Defendants’ motion for directed verdict finding that the amount of
force applied by the officers was “appropriate under the circumstances” and was applied in “good faith.” 83
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. 84 The majority held that the
District Court had applied the correct standard in assessing petitioner’s excessive force claim and adopting the four-factored test applied by the District Court as generally applicable to all claims of
excessive force. 85 The dissenting judge argued that, based on the decisions of Terry v. Ohio 86 and Tennessee v. Garner, excessive force
claims arising under the Fourth Amendment were appropriately examined under the “objective reasonableness” standard. 87
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 176 Side A
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79. Id. at 390.
80. Id. at 388.
81. Id. at 390.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 390–91.
84. Id. at 391.
85. Id. This four-factored test originated from Judge Friendly in his opinion in Johnson v.
Glick wherein Judge Friendly looked to neither the Fourth nor Eighth Amendments but to substantive due process in evaluating excessive force claims holding, “quite apart from any ‘specific’ of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a
suspect of liberty without due process of law.” 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Judge Friendly used the four-factored test to guide the Court in determining “whether the constitutional line has been crossed” by the particular use of force. Id. at
1033.
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
87. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 88 While this
outcome certainly seems appropriate, the larger ramifications of the
majority’s reasoning have inflicted a resounding blow on future litigants’ ability to challenge police use of force, particularly in claims
involving deadly force.
In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist built off of the dissenting opinion that he supported in Garner, holding that:
[T]he test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application . . . The “reasonableness” of a particular use
of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . The
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

Id.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

88.
89.
90.
91.
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Moreover, in response to the District Court and Court of Appeals
employing a substantive due process analysis, looking in part to the
subjective motivations and intentions of the officer as well as to the
extent of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, the Court announced that
the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective
one. 89 The majority wrote, “the question is whether the officer’s actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” 90 The Court further reasoned that even an “officer’s evil
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force.” 91
This statement is particularly troubling and, as is discussed in
Section III, the “objective reasonableness” standard announced by
the Court in Graham has become a defacto shield for law enforcement
who are afforded great deference in determining when a particular
use of force is “objectively reasonable” in the circumstances presented. While Graham presented a fairly easy case, that is police had
no objectively reasonable basis for utilizing any degree of force, this
standard has proved quite problematic in “close call” cases involving
police utilization of deadly force against suspects who arguably pose
a threat of serious harm to officers or the public at large.
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92. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the concurrence. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 399–400.
94. Id. at 400.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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In his concurring opinion in Graham, Justice Blackmun 92 reasoned that, while he agreed with the Court’s finding that “the Fourth
Amendment is the primary tool for analyzing claims of excessive force
in the prearrest context,” he saw, “no reason for the Court to find it
necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest excessive force
claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than
under a substantive due process standard.” 93 Justice Blackmun further stated he did not agree that the Court’s prior decision in Garner
supported such a reading. 94 Acknowledging that reliance on the
Fourth Amendment was a wise choice for Graham, Justice Blackmun
explained, “I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due process concerns.” 95 However, he concluded that “until I
am faced with a case in which that question is squarely raised . . . I
do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analysis
in prearrest cases.”96
Justice Blackmun likely asserted that the use of the Fourth
Amendment was a wise choice for Graham because it was obvious,
using an “objective reasonableness” standard, that the officers’ use
of force against a non-violent and, in fact, innocent individual in the
midst of a diabetic seizure was unreasonable. Looking to the subjective motivations and intentions of the officers, whether they were acting in “good faith” and whether there was a less harmful alternative
available, does not matter when it is obvious that the use of force is
objectively unreasonable. Nothing in the circumstances that the police
found themselves in would lead a reasonable officer to believe any
degree of force was reasonable or necessary in detaining Graham.
The Brown case, on the other hand, falls more in the category of a
“close call” where it is not so clear what amount of force was reasonable, or more precisely necessary, to end the threat that Brown
posed, whatever that threat may have been.
Cases like the shooting death of Michael Brown may be exactly
the sort of case that Justice Blackmun was eluding to when he refused
to join the majority in foreclosing the use of a substantive due process
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analysis for evaluating police use of force. However, the remainder of
Section II will address how a § 1983 claim would proceed under the
existing precedents of Garner and Graham, with the corresponding
“objective reasonableness” standard. Section III will then contrast this
with how the same case may unfold under a substantive due process
evaluation, initially presented by Judge Friendly in his 1976 decision
in Johnson v. Glick and which Justice Blackmun would have left open
as a possible alternative pathway to an actionable § 1983 claim in
Graham.
C. Garner, Graham, and Michael Brown

12/28/2015 14:43:02

97. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
98. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.046 (West 2014).
99. Id.
100. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
101. Id. at 399. The Court did, however, note that “in assessing the credibility of an officer’s
account of the circumstances that prompted the use of force, a factfinder may consider, along
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Under the existing law, to commence an action against Officer
Wilson, Brown’s mother would file a Complaint with the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri claiming a violation
of her deceased son’s civil rights. The claim would be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of Brown’s right to be
“secure in [his] person[] . . . from unreasonable . . . seizures” under
the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97
Missouri law regulating police use of deadly force affords law enforcement officers the full grant of authority allowable under Garner
and Graham. 98 Specifically, the state statute authorizes police to use
deadly force “in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from
custody . . . when [the officer] reasonably believes . . . [it] is immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that
the person to be arrested has committed or attempted to commit a
felony . . . or may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical
injury unless arrested without delay.” 99
Based on the decision in Graham, a purely objective perspective
would be employed in evaluating the reasonableness of Officer Wilson’s decision to use deadly force. 100 Emphasizing this purely objective perspective, the Graham Court reiterated, “subjective concepts
like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.” 101 Subsequent jurisprudence in the area of police excessive force in the
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with other factors, evidence that the officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.” Id. at
399 n.12; see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
102. Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Based on the outcome of the Missouri Grand Jury Indictment proceedings and the Department of Justice investigation into the shooting, it is very unlikely that such evidence can be
marshaled. See Peralta & Chappell, supra note 15.
105. Rachel Clarke & Christopher Lett, What Happened when Michael Brown Met Officer
Darren Wilson, CNN (Nov. 11, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/08/us/ferguson-brown-timeline/index.html?iid=article_sidebar.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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wake of Graham has established that, where “potential danger, emergency conditions or other exigent circumstances are present,” the
“standard of reasonableness is comparatively generous to the police.” 102 While the case law does not make clear what constitutes a
“potential danger,” whether a lower court is addressing substantive
liability or qualified immunity, “the Supreme Court intends to surround
the police who make . . . on-the-spot choices in dangerous situations
with a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases.” 103
Given this extremely deferential posture, depending on the evidence fleshed out during initial discovery, it is very likely that the §
1983 claim brought on behalf of Michael Brown, under the current
standard, would result in summary judgment in favor of Officer Wilson
either on the issue of qualified immunity or substantive liability. This
is particularly true if there is no credible evidence supporting the theory that Brown was attempting to surrender when he was shot to
death. 104
Looking to what appear to be the undisputed facts, Michael
Brown and Dorian Johnson, ages eighteen and twenty-two respectively, visited Ferguson Market and Liquor a little before noon and
stole a pack of cigarillos. 105 Immediately after the two young men left
the liquor store, a 911 call was placed to report the theft and, within
minutes, a police dispatcher relayed information to officers on duty
that the suspects of an alleged theft were walking northbound on a
road running adjacent to the liquor store. 106 Shortly thereafter, while
patrolling in his squad car, Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson encountered Brown and Johnson walking in the middle of the road and
ordered them to get out of the street. 107 While Wilson had not initially
made contact with Brown and Johnson because of the reported theft,
soon after the initial encounter, he recognized that the young men
matched the description relayed by dispatch as being involved in a
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suspected theft and reengaged them. 108 A dispute arose that progressed into a physical altercation between Brown and Wilson including wrestling through the window of Wilson’s squad car. 109 As the two
wrestled, a shot was fired from Wilson’s gun from within the vehicle
that struck Brown and caused him to flee from the immediate vicinity
of the vehicle. 110 Wilson immediately exited his vehicle, issued at least
one verbal command, and shortly thereafter, Brown, who was later
confirmed to be unarmed, was shot to death by Wilson. 111 An autopsy
report revealed that Brown had been shot at least six times, including
gunshot wounds to his right hand, arm, chest, and head. 112 The autopsy further indicated that Brown sustained a close proximity gunshot wound to his right hand, indicative of a struggle over Officer
Wilson’s gun while the two wrestled through the window of Wilson’s
vehicle. 113 Beyond these salient facts, the stories of the respective
parties, and those reverberating through American mainstream and
underground media outlets, substantially diverge. 114
For the purposes of this article, a few factual assumptions are
made. It is assumed that Officer Wilson did not confront Brown and
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108. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V) at 208–09, State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (Mo. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 10, 2014) (transcript at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1370494-grandjury-volume-5.html).
109. Clarke, supra note 105.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struck At
Least 6 Times, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michaelbrown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at-least-6-times.html?_r=0; ST. LOUIS CTY., OFFICE OF THE
MED. EXAM’R, POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION (2014).
113. Christine Byers, Official Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Had Close-Range Wound to
his Hand, Marijuana in System, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/official-autopsy-shows-michael-brown-had-close-rangewound-to/article_e98a4ce0-c284-57c9-9882-3fb7df75fef6.html; POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION,
supra note 112.
114. See supra Introduction. In his Grand Jury testimony, Dorian Johnson painted Wilson
as the aggressor stating he initiated the physical altercation and shot Brown to death when
Brown was attempting to surrender. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume IV) at 45–54, 100–23,
State of Mo. v. Darren Wilson (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 2014) (transcript at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-assets/grand-jury-testimony.pdf). Wilson, on the other hand, testified that Brown was the aggressor, asserting Brown
attacked him, began punching him in the face and was overpowering him while wrestling for his
gun, leaving him no choice but to fire his weapon. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V), supra
note 108, at 208–36. Wilson indicated that even without Brown grabbing for his gun, he was
authorized to use deadly force when Brown was punching him in his face. Id. at 236–37. Wilson
described his need in firing the final fatal shots, stating Brown stopped fleeing, turned around
and charged at him. Id. at 234. Wilson also explained his reasoning for pursuing Brown stating,
“what would stop him from doing what he has just did to me to [another officer] or worse, knowing
he has already done it to one cop.” Id. at 281.
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115. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d
919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000)).
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Johnson with the intent of murdering Brown. It is also assumed that
Officer Wilson was acting in furtherance of his duties as a law enforcement officer when he and Brown became engaged in a physical
altercation. Finally, it is assumed that the forensic evidence offered
will support that Brown and Wilson wrestled through the window of
Wilson’s squad car, including wrestling over Wilson’s gun once it was
drawn, causing the close proximity gunshot wound to Brown’s right
hand. At that point, the uncontested facts support that Brown fled from
the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s squad car before the fatal shots
were fired.
At this point, three possibilities emerge. One, Brown turned and
attempted to surrender when Wilson shot and killed him. Two, Brown
turned and charged toward Wilson when Wilson shot and killed him.
Or three, Brown turned and did not either immediately charge toward
Wilson or attempt to surrender. The first scenario presents an easy
case, whereby assessment of liability under the “objective reasonableness” standard would be straightforward. No reasonable officer
could believe that an unarmed suspect who is trying to surrender
poses a serious risk of harm to either the officer or the public such
that use of deadly force would be warranted. The second and especially the third scenarios seem to fall in what Justice Kennedy dubbed
the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” 115 that the
“objective reasonableness” standard is ill-suited to address. Is an unarmed suspect, who’s only “weapon” is his body, a serious enough
threat to an officer’s safety to justify the use of deadly force? Under
the second scenario, does an unarmed suspect “charging” at an officer elevate the risk of serious harm such that deadly force is appropriate? Under the third scenario, if the suspect is not charging towards
the officer, but also is not heeding orders to surrender, does that justify use of deadly force? Would some form of less-lethal force have
been more appropriate?
As the Graham court suggests, the deference given to police in
utilization of force is meant to cast a “wide zone of protection in close
cases,” which will typically manifest itself in a grant of qualified immunity, unless their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
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known.” 116 Of course, what is “clearly established” is a matter of perspective and the deferential posture afforded to police tends to tip this
balance in favor of immunity for police in close cases.
However, even if the case survived summary judgment, the court
must instruct the jury to determine whether the officer’s use of force
was “objectively reasonable” by balancing “the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against
the interests of the police in making the arrest in the particular manner
it was made. 117 Here, that of course entails utilization of deadly force.
As the Court in Graham announced:
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in
the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 118

12/28/2015 14:43:02

116. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
117. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
118. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 397.
121. Id.
122. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 194 (2004).
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Given this deferential posture, the Court has held that the jury
should be instructed to give careful attention to the facts and circumstances of the case, “including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 119 These factors must be considered “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to underlying intent or motivation.” 120 Any “evil intentions” motivating an officer’s objectively reasonable use of force “will not make
a Fourth Amendment violation.” 121
A case somewhat similar to the fact pattern in the Brown case
which applied this standard is Brosseau v. Haugen. 122 In Brosseau,
the Supreme Court addressed a § 1983 claim involving police use of
deadly force wherein a police officer shot an unarmed suspect in the
back while trying to evade arrest. While on first blush, the Court’s prior
decision in Garner would seem to render such use of force patently
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123. Id. at 200.
124. Id. at 199–200 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
125. Id. at 200.
126. Id.
127. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the officer “had probable
cause to believe that the [suspect’s] truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to
innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves.”); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347
(6th Cir. 1992) (noting “a car can be a deadly weapon” and holding the officer’s decision to use
deadly force to stop the car from possibly injuring others was reasonable).
128. Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330–31.
129. Freland, 954 F.2d at 344.
130. Id.
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unconstitutional, the Court found that Haugen, the suspect, possessed a “weapon,” his vehicle, and posed a threat of “serious harm”
to officers and the public at large. 123 Therefore, the Court decided that
qualified immunity prevented the claim from even progressing past
the dispositive stage, thus negating the need to even reach the question of whether the officer’s use of deadly force was “objectively reasonable.”
As the Court discussed, “[we] ask whether, at the time of [the
officer’s] actions, it was ‘clearly established’ in this more ‘particularized’ sense that she was violating Haugen’s Fourth Amendment
right.” 124 In reaching their decision, the Court noted that the parties
pointed to a handful of cases “relevant to the ‘situation [Officer
Brosseau] confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.” 125 Specifically, Officer Brosseau’s representatives pointed to Cole v. Bone and Smith v.
Freland 126
In Cole and Smith, no Fourth Amendment violations were found
when an officer shot a fleeing suspect who “presented a risk to others.” 127 Specifically, in Cole officers engaged in a high speed chase
of a suspect driving an eighteen wheel tractor-trailer recklessly, refusing to yield to roadblocks, ramming police cars, and forcing civilian
motorists off of the roadway, resulting in police shooting the suspect
in the head, killing him, to end the pursuit. 128 Likewise, in Smith the
officer engaged in a car chase, which appeared to be at an end when
the officer cornered the suspect at the back of a dead-end residential
street. 129 However, the suspect freed his car and began speeding
down the street at which point the officer shot and killed the suspect. 130 The officer’s use of deadly force was found to be reasonable,
and therefore not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because the
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Id.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004).
Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993).
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
Id.
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131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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suspect “had proven he would do almost anything to avoid capture”
and posed a serious threat to the other officers at the end of the
street.131
On the other hand, Haugen pointed to Estate of Starks v. Enyart
“where the court found summary judgment inappropriate on a Fourth
Amendment claim involving a fleeing suspect.”132 The Starks court
held that the threat created by the fleeing suspect’s failure to brake
when an officer suddenly stepped in front of his just-started car was
not a sufficiently grave threat to justify the use of deadly force.133
Taken together, the court in Brosseau v. Haugen reasoned, the
three cases “undoubtedly show that this area is one in which the result
depends very much on the facts of each case. None of them squarely
governs the case here; they do suggest that Brosseau’s actions fell
in the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.’”134 The
court definitively held, however, that these cases “by no means
‘clearly establish’ that Brosseau’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment” and therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity for her use of
deadly force in shooting Haugen in the back as he attempted to drive
away.135
Applying the holding and reasoning of Brosseau to the case of
Michael Brown, if the evidence shows that Officer Wilson and Brown
initially wrestled over Wilson’s gun, the requirement that Wilson reasonably believed deadly force was necessary given the possible danger Brown continued to pose after he fled from the immediate vicinity
of the vehicle is likely satisfied. Such apprehension would combat any
assertion by Brown’s representatives that Wilson’s conduct violated a
“clearly established” constitutional protection because there is no
such protection afforded to citizens to resist arrest by flight once an
officer has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous. The fact
that Brown wrestled with a police officer over his firearm would provide the ongoing threat of serious harm that the court found to be a
prerequisite to a finding of “objective reasonableness” in Graham and
subsequently elaborated upon in Brosseau. As Officer Wilson testified
during his Grand Jury testimony “what would stop him from doing
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136. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V), supra note 108, at 281.
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what he has just did to me to [another officer] or worse, knowing he
has already done it to one cop.” 136 Certainly, if Brown’s representatives could prove that Brown’s wrestling over the gun was merely
done in self-defense, that would not provide sufficient grounds for Officer Wilson to believe that Brown posed a threat of serious harm to
himself or others. However, based on the outcome of the Grand Jury
proceedings and Justice Department investigations, the likelihood of
Brown’s representatives marshaling such evidence is quite low.
Instead, under the existing law, as Justice O’Conner suggested
in her dissenting opinion in Garner, which Justice Rehnquist joined
and built upon in his majority opinion in Graham, Brown essentially
assumed the risk of deadly force by committing a violent felony, wrestling with Wilson over his gun, and thereafter forfeited any Fourth
Amendment interest he had to resist arrest by flight or non-deadly
force. Therefore, Wilson’s use of deadly force, did not violate a
“clearly established” constitutional protection such that qualified immunity would likely be granted because Brown arguably posed a risk
of serious harm, even after he fled from the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s vehicle. Moreover, even if qualified immunity were not granted,
Wilson’s use of deadly force would likely be found to be “objectively
reasonable” in the circumstances because of the ongoing threat
Brown posed, regardless of any underlying subjective motivations or
intentions that operated at the time the fatal shots were fired.
The force employed by Wilson was no more unreasonable than
the force applied in Brosseau, Cole or Smith, where the parties did
not dispute that the respective suspects were attempting to flee when
deadly force was employed. Here, the facts are unclear as to whether
Brown was attempting to flee or was continuing to resist arrest by
force when he was shot to death. Wilson’s representatives would argue that Brown’s recklessness and proclivity to violence, exhibited by
his attempting to wrestle a gun away from a police officer, created a
serious risk of harm to Wilson and others that continued to exist even
once Brown fled from the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s vehicle.
Therefore, Wilson’s decision to employ deadly force to neutralize that
threat did not violate a “clearly established” constitutional protection,
as Brown had assumed the risk associated with the use of deadly
force and effectively waived any protection he would otherwise have
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had; thus, the use of force was “objectively reasonable” in the circumstances.
Given the current state of the law and the apparently uncontested
facts of the Brown case, it is very difficult to see a § 1983 claim surviving summary judgment. Whether or not that is the “right” outcome
in this case is immaterial to this discussion. What is material, however,
is how that conclusion is reached. By relying solely on the “objective
reasonableness” standard to justify police use of deadly force to shoot
and kill an unarmed suspect, the law ignores a key question that any
lay person would ask. Was there anything else that could have been
done to avoid the loss of life? Maybe, and maybe not. But that question ought to be asked and exclusive reliance on the lens of “objective
reasonableness” does not allow it to be.
III. IS THERE ANOTHER WAY?

12/28/2015 14:43:02

137. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1973).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1031; see also Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1973) (wherein
Judge Knapp stated in dictum “[w]e assume that brutal police conduct violates a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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A possible alternative to the narrow perspective that the “objective reasonableness” standard affords was addressed by Judge
Henry Friendly sitting for the Second Circuit in the 1976 case Johnson
v. Glick. In Glick, Judge Friendly addressed the validity of a § 1983
claim brought by a prisoner against the warden and a guard at a detention facility alleging the guard made an unprovoked attack on him
and detained him in a holding cell for two hours before returning him
to his cell. 137 When the prisoner requested medical attention, the
guard held him in his cell for another two hours before permitting him
to see a doctor. 138 Struggling to apply the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the case before him,
Judge Friendly looked instead to a prior case decided by the Second
Circuit that had invoked a substantive due process analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment as the constitutional basis for a § 1983
claim. 139 The trouble, Judge Friendly reasoned, with applying the
Eighth Amendment to the case was twofold.
First, he recognized that a single act by a rogue prison guard did
not present the type of institutional abuse that is typically required to
satisfy a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment because it was done in accordance with some existing
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140. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (in addressing the constitutionality
of a conviction based on coercion, Justice Frankfurter held “[i]t has long since ceased to be true
that due process of law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible
evidence is obtained”).
147. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170–71)); see also Collum v. Butler,
421 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he force used by the officers was unreasonable and
unnecessary to restrain the plaintiff thus violating his constitutional right of due process.”); Tolbert v. Bragan, 451 F.2d 1020, 1020 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Severe physical abuse of prisoners by
their keepers without cause or provocation is actionable under the Civil Rights Act.”).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 182 Side A

institutional policy or procedure. 140 Judge Friendly stated that, “[t]he
thread common to all these cases is that ‘punishment’ has been deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose, with the
apparent authorization of high prison officials charged by the state
with responsibility for care, control, and discipline of prisoners.” 141 In
contrast, Judge Friendly suggested that, while certainly cruel and
hopefully unusual, a spontaneous act by a prison guard did not fit with
any ordinary meaning of “punishment.” 142 Second, Judge Friendly expressed that “[w]e have considerable doubt that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause is properly applicable at all until after conviction
and sentence.” 143 However, “it would be absurd,” Judge Friendly observed, “to hold that a pre-trial detainee has less constitutional
protection against acts of prison guards than one who has been
convicted.” 144
To resolve these problems with applying the Eighth Amendment
to a case where it appeared obvious that justice demanded liability be
imposed, Judge Friendly held, “both before and after sentence, constitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct
violating specific command of the Eighth Amendment or . . . the
Fourth.” 145 Instead, Judge Friendly suggested, “Rochin v. California 146
must stand for the proposition that, quite apart from any ‘specific’ of
the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.” 147
In Rochin – the Supreme Court decision Judge Friendly relies
upon as the basis for applying a substantive due process analysis to
a § 1983 claim – the Court elaborated upon the purpose of the Due
Process Clause stating:
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Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause ‘inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the
whole course of the proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether
they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward
those charged with the most heinous offenses.’. . . Due process of
law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for
the Court, are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental’ or are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ 148
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148. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
149. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
150. Id.
151. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)
(wherein Justice Scalia announced “the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . focus . . . on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is
taken”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have held
repeatedly, in cases the Court today does not overrule, that only fundamental rights qualify for
this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protection—that is, rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition’ such as the right to life, liberty, or property as expressly stated in
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Recognizing that a test was needed to gauge when an intentional
use of force rose to the level of a constitutional infringement, Judge
Friendly suggested four factors for courts to consider in Glick. 149
Those factors included, “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,
the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 150
Ultimately, Judge Friendly found that in applying the four factored
test he had announced, the dismissal of Johnson’s complaint against
the officer, Fuller, for excessive force was not appropriate and reversed the lower court’s ruling with respect to Officer Fuller.
While substantive due process is a hotly contested area of constitutional law, even the most conservative approaches to a substantive application of the Due Process Clause have recognized that the
core individual rights protected by the Constitution generally and the
Due Process Clause specifically are “life, liberty, [and] property.” 151 It
is difficult to imagine a more valuable individual right than the right to
one’s own life. Certainly, this is something that has traditionally been
afforded great protection by the laws and courts of this country.
Turning to the case of Michael Brown, applying the four-factored
substantive due process test employed by Judge Friendly in Glick, a
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much different perspective emerges in evaluating Officer Wilson’s
conduct, specifically his decision to employ deadly force, than exists
under an “objective reasonableness” approach. This difference in perspective is illuminated by looking to each of Judge Friendly’s factors
in turn:
(1) The need for the application of force:
This factor changes the perception of the officer’s use of force.
Instead of asking whether the officer’s use of force was “objectively
reasonable,” the court inquires whether the use of force was necessary. Depending on what the evidence bears as to whether Brown or
Officer Wilson was the instigator of the initial physical altercation, the
need for the officer to employ some amount of force would be a jury
question. That is, if Wilson instigated the altercation, forcing Brown to
take action merely in self-defense, then the initial need for any amount
of force would be doubtful and this factor may be dispositive in favor
of Brown. 152
On the other hand, if the evidence bears out that Brown instigated the physical altercation, Wilson would of course be within his
rights to respond with some level of force. However, whether any level
of force is necessary is only the first step in the equation. The relationship between the need for some amount of force and the amount
of force actually employed (less-lethal versus deadly force) is taken
up in Judge Friendly’s second factor.

Even if we assume some level of force was justified, either because Brown instigated the physical altercation or the physical altercation derived mutually from both parties, the relationship between
the need for some level of force and the amount of force actually employed must coincide. Therefore, if it is assumed that there was a
physical struggle through the window of Wilson’s car over his gun,
once a shot was fired and Brown fled from the immediate vicinity of
the vehicle, the jury would need to determine whether the continued
need for some level of force to detain Brown and the amount of force

12/28/2015 14:43:02

152. Even under an “objective reasonableness” analysis, in such easy cases where no
amount of force was reasonable or necessary, the underlying constitutional hook, Fourth
Amendment or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, would not matter.
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(2)The relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used:
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153. Just as the Court found existed in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004); Cole
v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); and Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir.
1992). See supra Section II.C.
154. Wilson testified that he radioed for backup prior to the physical altercation with Brown
and that additional officers arrived on scene no more than a minute after the fatal shots were
fired. Transcript of Grand Jury (Volume V), supra note 108, at 208–36.
155. Wilson testified that he was given a choice, but elected not to carry a Taser. Id. at 206.
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actually used, shooting Brown five more times, was appropriate in the
circumstances to secure Wilson’s objective of detaining Brown.
This crucial step, examining the relationship between the need
for the use of force and the amount of force actually used, completely
shifts the focus of the analysis from what could be construed as a
reasonable amount of force in the circumstances to what was the necessary amount of force in the particular circumstance. While it may
have been “objectively reasonable,” under the deferential “objective
reasonableness” approach, for Wilson to use deadly force to detain
Brown after he exhibited a threat of serious harm to Wilson and others
by wrestling with him over his gun, 153 it is less clear whether that same
level of force was necessary.
Judge Friendly’s model allows the court and jury to consider the
basic question of whether there was something else Officer Wilson
could have done to attain his objective other than resorting to deadly
force. This would be a question of fact for the fact-finder to determine
upon consideration of all of the available evidence, but it is plausible
for Brown’s representatives to argue that Wilson had alternatives to
the utilization of deadly force. Could he have remained in his squad
car until backup arrived? 154 Could he have used less lethal force, such
as a baton or pepper spray, 155 to detain Brown? Should departmental
practices have required that Wilson carry a Taser or beanbag projectile at all times while on duty as an alternative, less-lethal force option
to detain hostile suspects where use of deadly force can be avoided?
While the answers to these questions are not clear and would need
to be resolved through the adversarial process, the mere fact of asking whether there was anything that could have been done differently
would, from a sociological perspective, help allay the inherent coldness and sense of institutionalized inequity and indifference that attaches to a justification of “objective reasonableness” for the loss of
life.
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(3)The extent of injury inflicted:

12/28/2015 14:43:02

156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 65, 76 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
157. See, e.g., Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
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Application of this factor to the use of deadly force is, of course,
quite simple. The loss of life is the most serious injury a person can
sustain. Despite its simple application in the case of Michael Brown,
this factor serves the important function of placing the sanctity of life
at the forefront of the analysis in police use of deadly force cases. To
pass constitutional muster under a substantive due process analysis,
the officer must account for the necessity of their use of force in relation to the injury ultimately suffered by the plaintiff, in this case, death.
Therefore, Officer Wilson would need to establish that his decision to
use deadly force, with the foreseeable consequence of the suspect’s
death, was necessary and was the only reasonable option available
to him to protect his own life or the life of others in order to justify the
use of deadly force. This again infers that the officer has exhausted
any alternative, less-lethal force options that could have been utilized
to obtain the same result, in this case, detaining Brown. Of course, as
with civilian use of deadly force in self-defense or defense of others,
this factor is not dispositive if an officer reasonably misapprehends a
serious threat to their life or the life of another. 156 However, an officer’s
reasonable misapprehension of the situation they were confronted
with would not shield the officer from civil liability, as would generally
be the case under an “objective reasonableness” approach, 157 if, on
balance, the four-factored substantive due process test weighs in favor of imposing liability.
This leads back to the discussion under the second factor of
Judge Friendly’s analysis, whether the amount of force used was necessary. If there is any doubt about that factor, coupled with this third
factor, the extent of injury inflicted, in this case death, then the two
factors weigh heavily in favor of imposing civil liability under a substantive due process approach. This approach still shields individual
officers who are forced to make split-second decisions in hostile situations, from criminal responsibility for such decisions. However, police agencies, responsible for training, supervising and equipping
officers in the field, would be forced to take responsibility for officers’
faulty decisions to resort to the use of deadly force when it is not
deemed to be necessary in the circumstances.
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(4)Whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

158. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
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This factor is somewhat problematic because it seems to infer
that for liability to attach under a substantive due process analysis,
the officer’s conduct had to be “malicious and sadistic.” This amounts
essentially to a criminal law standard of proof. In the case of Brown,
this would be particularly problematic because a Grand Jury declined
to bring criminal charges against Wilson. This suggests that the evidence did not bear out that Wilson’s use of deadly force was “malicious and sadistic.” However, this factor must be considered in the
context of the other three factors in considering the totality of the circumstances. That is, if the first three factors heavily favor imposing
liability, it is not necessary to show that the use of force was “sadistic
or malicious.” Even if the use of force was applied “in good faith,” if it
was not necessary, the need for the use of some level of force was
substantially out of proportion to the amount of force actually employed, and the extent of the injury to the plaintiff was severe, liability
would still attach.
However, if the need for the use of some level of force is apparent, but the officer’s use of force was “sadistic and malicious” (e.g. in
bad faith with an intent to harm), then liability would also attach. An
example of such a scenario can be envisioned in the present case. If
it is assumed that Wilson did have a legitimate need to employ deadly
force in order to detain Brown, but he fired an extra three or four
rounds because he was angry over the initial confrontation and
wanted to kill rather than merely detain Brown, liability would attach
based on this factor.
This factor further highlights the difference between the “objective reasonableness” standard and the substantive due process
standard. Under the “objective reasonableness” standard, in the foregoing hypothetical, Wilson’s subjective motivations or evil intentions
in firing the extra three or four rounds would be irrelevant so long as
a reasonable officer in the circumstances would believe the use of
deadly force was reasonable in the circumstances. 158 Courts have
consistently held that, where an officer reasonably perceives, even if
this turns out to be a misperception in hindsight, a threat of serious
harm to other officers or the public, shooting with the intention to kill
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does not offend constitutional principles. 159 Therefore, an officer’s use
of lethal force would pass constitutional muster under an “objective
reasonableness” standard where the officer can articulate probable
cause to believe the suspect posed a serious risk of harm to other
officers or the public without inquiring as to the officer’s subjective
intentions when the fatal shots were fired. Under Judge Friendly’s rubric, such subjective intentions or motivations are relevant, and in fact
central, to the consideration of whether the use of deadly force was
appropriate in the circumstances.
Ultimately, it would be left up to the finder of fact to determine
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the four factors
of Judge Friendly’s subjective due process analysis supported Officer
Wilson’s decision to use deadly force or whether such force was unnecessary such that liability would attach. However, it is clear that this
analysis provides much greater consideration and protection to the
individual’s fundamental interest in their own life and to the societal
interest in the sanctity of all human life. If at the end of the presentation of evidence, a jury found that there was simply nothing else Officer Wilson could have reasonably done differently in the
circumstances he encountered, no liability would attach to his decision to employ deadly force. But, the mere fact that such inquiry is
made goes to the very question that the “objective reasonableness”
standard fails to address to the detriment of those touched most
closely by the death of Michael Brown: “Wasn’t there anything else
that could’ve been done?”
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 185 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

159. See, e.g., Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. Appx. 378, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (detective’s use of deadly force in fatally shooting suspect was objectively reasonable, and thus did not violate Fourth Amendment; although there was no weapon found in
suspect’s vicinity, detective’s account of the events, corroborated by affidavits of others at the
scene, indicated that suspect failed to comply with detective’s instructions and appeared to be
reaching for a weapon before detective shot him, and there was no indication that suspect was
fleeing at the time he was shot); Melvin v. Karman, 550 Fed. Appx. 218, 219 (5th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished) (detectives decision to shoot and kill a fifteen year old boy in his bedroom was
objectively reasonable where the boy wielded a knife, failed to heed the officers’ instructions to
drop the knife, and approached the officers wielding the knife); Chappell v. City of Cleveland,
585 F.3d 901, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2009); Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 404–
05 (6th Cir. 2007) (where a police sniper fired two shots, fatally wounding the suspect, did not
amount to excessive force because the officer reasonably believed the suspect holding a rifle
at waist level posed a risk of significant harm to approaching officers); contra Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 13-14396, 2015 WL 4098270, at *8 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding
allegations that deputies responding to 911 call shot caller’s son without warning when he did
not pose a threat was sufficient to state excessive force under the Fourth Amendment).
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B. Seeking “Justice” for Ferguson
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160. Graham, 490 U.S. at 400.
161. Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
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As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Graham,
“[while] I expect that the use of force that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due process concerns . . . until I am faced with [such] a case . . .
I do not join in foreclosing the use of substantive due process analysis.” 160 The wisdom in Justice Blackmun’s resistance to foreclosing
substantive due process as a possible alternative standard in analyzing use of force cases is evident when dealing with cases of deadly
force where the need for such force presents a “close call.” In these
cases, the competing interests between deferring to police officers’
judgments in tense, uncertain situations that may present grave danger to them and the public on one hand and the fundamental right all
individuals possess in their own lives on the other makes assignment
of liability a difficult query that must account for both these interests.
In such cases, the “objective reasonableness” standard simply does
not adequately account for the later interest. Application of the substantive due process standard posed by Judge Friendly provides a
more balanced perspective than the “objective reasonableness” lens
and goes much further in accounting for the individual’s fundamental
interest in their own life, regardless of the ultimate outcome.
As the Court announced in Rochin, a due process analysis requires, “exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses.” 161 While this requirement has traditionally been applied to
procedural due process (e.g., procedures used in criminal cases must
be fair), substantive due process seeks to apply these same “canons
of decency and fairness” to the application and enforcement of laws
to ensure they respect fundamental individual liberties. The Court has
further announced that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is meant, at a minimum, to “focus . . . on the processes
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162. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
164. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
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by which life, liberty, or property is taken,” 162 and that heightened scrutiny is to be applied to those individual rights that are “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 163
Upon this backdrop, as Justice White announced in Tennessee
v. Garner, it should go without saying that Michael Brown had a fundamental right to his own life. 164 That right deserves heightened scrutiny against adverse application of law. Of course, an individual’s right
to life, or any other fundamental right, is not absolute. If by his own
actions, Brown took away any practical choice Officer Wilson had to
use anything other than deadly force to protect himself or others, then
liability would not and should not attach. The ultimate determination
of what happened and whether deadly force was utilized as an unfortunate but necessary final option will be decided by those noble
twelve tasked with finding truth amongst the competing evidence marshaled by the parties.
However, if the right to life is fundamental, as Justice White suggests, canons of decency and fairness must attach to the processes
by which that right is deprived. By using an “objective reasonableness” perspective to govern the police’s use of deadly force, with its
wide grant of deference to police’s determination of when circumstances make the use of such force reasonable, heightened scrutiny
has not been afforded to the individual’s right to life. As this paper
seeks to show, the “objective reasonableness” standard announced
by the Supreme Court in Graham is inadequate in close cases involving police use of deadly force and results in an imbalance wherein the
deference granted to police judgment in the application of force consumes the inherent interest an individual possesses in their own life.
This imbalance feeds into the public perception that certain lives
simply do not matter in the eyes of the law. Changing the lens with
which police use of deadly force is evaluated would lead to a vastly
different societal perception of how application of law correlates with
substantive notions of justice, fairness and equality.
Even policing agencies seem to recognize that use of deadly
force and the standards governing it need to be reevaluated to prevent unnecessary loss of life. This is evidenced by the widespread
investment and implementation by police agencies across the nation
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in less-lethal force technology such as Tasers, beanbag projectiles,
pepper spray, and stun grenades. 165 Police agencies’ investment in
less-lethal force technology has expanded in the past several years
in light of statistical studies debunking traditionalist arguments that
reliance on less-lethal force may result in more officer related injuries
due to aggressive resistance by suspects not fearing less-lethal
force. 166 In the wake of the Brown shooting and other similar contemporary cases, police have begun having officers wear cameras attached to their uniforms to provide more transparency in police tactics
generally and use of force scenarios specifically. 167 Police have also
recently begun experimenting with casings to place on the muzzle of
standard issue police sidearms that make the first ordinary round fired
from an officer’s service weapon a less-lethal round. 168
A less deferential standard of review of deadly force cases would
likely continue to encourage police agencies individually and the Department of Justice collectively to support further research and investment into less-lethal force technologies and related training programs.
CONCLUSION
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165. See, e.g., Less-Lethal Technologies, JUSTNET,
https://www.justnet.org/less_lethal_tech/index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
166. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER
LESS-LETHAL W EAPONS 7–8 (2011); Phillip Bulman, Police Use of Force: The Impact of LessLethal Weapons and Tactics, NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 4, 4–5 (2011).
167. See, e.g., William Cummings, Ferguson Police Begin Using Body Cameras, USA
TODAY (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/01/ferguson-police-cameras/14920587/; Rory Carroll, California Police Use of Body Cameras Cuts Violence
and Complaints, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/california-police-body-cameras-cuts-violencecomplaints-rialto.
168. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Ferguson, Mo., Police Begin Testing New ‘Less-Lethal’ Attachment for Guns, W ASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ferguson-mo-police-department-is-first-in-us-to-test-less-lethal-gunattachment/2015/02/03/c6772af8-abb7-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html; Aaron Smith,
Ferguson Police Explore ‘Less Lethal’ Gun Attachment, CNN MONEY (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/05/smallbusiness/ferguson-police-less-lethal-gun/.
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Given the social unrest surrounding cases like that of Michael
Brown and the realization in policing that things may need to change,
it is time for the Court to catch up. Complete reliance on the “objective
reasonableness” standard with its deferential posture toward police
judgments in deadly force cases is outmoded and does not afford
proper respect for the sanctity of human life by asking if there is anything that could be done differently to avoid the loss of life. While the
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Fourth Amendment may very well be the appropriate vehicle for evaluating claims of non-deadly force, it should not be the sole constitutional avenue for challenging police use of deadly force.
The sociological impact of a mostly white court telling a mostly
black population in a low-income, urban setting policed by mostly
white police officers that a white cop shooting an unarmed black teenager to death was “objectively reasonable” is enormous, regardless
of its factual accuracy. If, however, the same court allows a jury of the
deceased’s peers to carefully examine the totality of the circumstances and asks the basic question, “Wasn’t there anything else that
could’ve been done?”, to which the answer is, “No,” it seems that may
be a much easier pill to swallow. The communities most directly affected by these decisions would have an outlet for their grievances
and an avenue for true accountability. It may very well follow that the
disconnect and discord between the members of those communities
like Ferguson and the boots on the ground policing them would begin
to be mended.
Returning to the question of responsibility, at the end of the day,
who is responsible for the death of Michael Brown . . . ? We may never
know for sure. But we do know what questions ought to be asked, and
that is all any of us can really ask for.
In addressing the country after the decision was made by the
Missouri Grand Jury not to indict Officer Wilson, President Obama
offered the following account of race relations in America:
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169. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Announcement of the Decision by the Grand Jury in Ferguson, Missouri (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:08 PM) (on file at
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We need to recognize that this is not just an issue for Ferguson,
this is an issue for America. We have made enormous progress in
race relations over the course of the past several decades. I’ve witnesses that in my own life. And to deny that progress I think is to
deny America’s capacity for change.
But what is also true is that there are still problems and communities
of color aren’t just making these problems up. Separating that from
this particular decision, there are issues in which the law too often
feels as if it is being applied in discriminatory fashion. I don’t think
that’s the norm. I don’t think that’s true for the majority of communities or the vast majority of law enforcement officials. But these are
real issues. And we have to lift them up and not deny them or try to
tamp them down. What we need to do is to understand them and
figure out how do we make more progress. And that can be
done. 169
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Setting aside any political agenda, there appears to be great wisdom and truth in these words. While the solution to this very serious
and age old problem is not obvious or simple, I would suggest that
this modification in the application of a law meant to protect the civil
rights of all Americans is an appropriate and necessary step in the
right direction. While this would admittedly be a very modest measure
at tackling an issue that our country has grappled with since its inception, as the age old proverb suggests, a journey of a thousand miles
begins with a single step.
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